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Summary  findings
Maloney uses cross-country data from Latin America and  turnover as indicators of distortion  or rigidity without
OECD countries to test the predictions of a simple  first adjusting for these factors. Somewhat speculatively,
efficiency wage model (Krebs and Maloney 1998) about  Maloney offers adjusted measures that suggest that Latin
the share of the workforce in self-employment and the  American labor markets are not especially distorted and
rate of labor turnover across the process of development  are about average in flexibility, with important
and demographic transition.  exceptions.
The model is supported, with numerous demographic,  Central to the theoretical framework is the view that
economic, and labor market institutions appearing as  self-employment is a desirable destination for many
important  determinants of both self-employment and  salaried workers rather than the disadvantaged sector of
turnover. Social security taxes on firms and barriers to  a labor market segmented by union- or government-
firing workers appear to reduce the size of the formal  induced rigidities. To prevent the loss of investment in
sector, and barriers to firing do appear to reduce  training to the informal sector, firms will pay above-
turnover. But the level of formal sector productivity, real  market-clearing "efficiency wages," in the process
interest rates, and education levels generally have a  creating unemployment or segmentation that may cut
greater impact.  across lines of formality.
A central lesson is that it is misleading to use the size
of the informal self-employed sector and the rate of labor
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This paper develops and tests an integrated approach to understanding two outstanding
questions central to understanding the functioning of LDC labor markets and the impact of labor
legislation.  Though the paper focuses primarily on Latin America, the issues and analysis are
germane both to other LDCs and the industrialized countries.
The first is the role of the large informal sector in the region (see table 1). A traditional
view argues that the sector testifies to government or union indLuced  rigidities that force formal
remuneration above market clearing and ration workers into informality.' We argue that this view
is probably incorrect and that it is difficult to draw any conclusions about efficiency  from sector
size alone.
The second question centers on what recent findings of high turnover, a common measure
of rigidities (see Nickell 1997), imply about the flexibility of labor markets in the region. 2 It is
often asserted that high firing costs and excessive benefits in the formal sector prevent the
efficient allocation of workers among  jobs.3 However, as table 1 suggests, average tenure is
shorter, and a larger fraction of the work force has been employed in their current position for
less than two years in Latin America than in the OECD. We argue that this probably cannot be
interpreted a priori as evidence of greater flexibility.
The structure of the paper is as follows:  Section 2 heuristically develops a model that
moves beyond the standard segmentation-based view of the relationship of formal and informal
' See  Harris  and  Todaro  (1970)  for an  early  presentation  of this  view.
2See  Maloney  (1995)  for  Mexico,  Gonzaga  (1996)  for  Brazil,  Aniderson  Shaffner  (1997)  for  Colombia,
Marquez  and  Pagds  (1998)  more  generally.  See  Hopenhayn  and Rogerson  (1993)  for a recent  theoretical
discussion.
3 See  for  example  Burki  and  Perry  (1997)  The  Long  March.sectors,  and incorporates  the increasing  evidence  that a large fraction  of the employment  in the
informal  sector is voluntary. It is developed  in an efficiency  wage context  both because  recent
evidence  suggests  that much observed  segmentation  may arise  endogenously  rather  than being
imposed  by labor  unions  or minimum  wages,  and because  it permits explicit  modeling  of the
determinants  of turnover.  Predictions  can be made about how  the size of the self-employed
sector, the degree  of segmentation  in the market,  and turnover  should  move with the
development  process  and policy  innovations.
Section  3 examines  cross  country  data  from Latin  America,  Europe  and Asia with three
objectives.  The first two are straightforward:  to test the predictions  of the model  about  the size of
the informal  sector and rates of turnover  with respect  to several  key labor  market,  productivity,
and demographic  variables  suggested  by the theoretical  framework  and second,  to suggest  the
direction  of possible  influence  of variables  that are theoretically  ambiguous.  But somewhat
speculatively,  we also attempt  to provide  more  informed  estimates  of the incidence  of
unmeasurable  distortions  that ration more workers  into the informal  sector or rigidities  that
decrease  turnover.  Since  our theoretical  framework  abstracts  from such  exogenous  phenomena,
we tentatively  measure  their impact  by the deviations  from the model's predicted  values.  Though
it is trivial  to raise objections  to this approach  on either  theoretical  or empirical  grounds,  the
results  at once strongly  coincide  with  the stylized  facts  about industrialized  countries  and
challenge  what is commonly  thought  about  Latin  America:  with some  predictable  exceptions,
regional  labor  markets  do not appear  unusually  distorted  or inflexible.
22. Motivation  and Theoretical  Overview
The empirical work here is motivated by a macroeconomic model based on micro
behavior of workers describe in detail in Krebs and Maloney 1  998. It is built as a growth model
so that secular movements in labor productivity can be incorporated and makes predictions about
movements in formal and informal sector employment, the degree market segmentation, and
labor turnover rates across the course of the development process.  It also attempts to incorporate
two emerging stylized facts about LDC labor markets.
1. The  informal  sector is extremely  heterogeneous  containing  both voluntary  and
involuntary  members. The informal sector is frequently consiidered  the disadvantaged segment
of a labor marketed segmented by government or union intervention in the wage setting process
in the formal sector. 4 During downturns, the sector is thought to expand as it absorbs displaced
workers, then contracting again with recovery.
While some fraction of the sector corresponds to this view,  recent studies find that many
of the informal employed are voluntarily so and should probably be viewed as unregulated
entrepreneurs.  Comparisons of  formal/informal wage differentials traditionally used to show
segmentation have been shown to be meaningless, and there appears to be high degrees of
mobility among sectors. 5 The Mexican micro-enterprise survey suggests that 70% of workers
enter the sector voluntarily for reasons of independence or higher income and recent time series
4  See the classic  statement  of this view in Harris  and Todaro(1974).
5 In the absence  of any distortions,  we should find  a wedge  between  formal  and informal  incomes  that
incorporates  the value  of benefits  forgone,  the value of taxes  evaded,  the value  of lifestyle  differences  between  wage
and self-employment,  capital  costs,  implicit  training  costs and  payments  in kind. Without  this information,  wage
comparisons-tell  us nothing  about segmentation  or relative  welfare  between  sectors.  See  MacIsaac  and  Rama  (1997)
and Maloney  (1995, 1997a.)
3data from Mexico  and Chile suggest  that both the size,  of and transitions  into the self-employed
sector  behave  procyclically. 6 There is increasing  evidence  both in the sociology  and economics
literature  that suggests  a life cycle  view of the trajectory  between  formal  and informal  self-
employment:  in the absence  of well-functioning  credit  markets  and effective  educational
systems,  workers  may take formal  sector  jobs to accumulate  human  and financial  capital  and
then quit to open their own  business. 7 In sum,  there is ample evidence  suggesting  that self-
employment  is a desirable  destination  for many  workers  who  voluntarily  leave  formal
employment.
2.  In the absence of government or union induced rigidities, there is still strong evidence
of "segmentation.  " Recent  work on Mexico  challenges  the customary  view of the sources  of
labor  market  segmentation.  Minimum  wages  are not binding  (See Bell 1998)  and the evidence
suggests  that union  power  is directed  largely  to the maintenance  of employment  and find no
significant  effect on wages.' As Marquez  and Ros (1990),  noted, and has been confirmed  by
later studies  for Peru (Shaffner,1998)and  Guatemala  (Funkhauserl998),  wages  of similar
workers  rise with firm size,  much as they do in industrialized  countries. Further,  Marquez
(1990),  and Abuhadba  and Romaguera  (1993)  find evidence  consistent  with efficiency  wage
effects  in the high correlation  of wage  differentials  among  Chile,  Venezuela,  and Brazil  and the
6 See Maloney  (1997b)  and Pages(1998).  Pais de Barros  finds  no cyclical  movement  in Brazil. Saavedra  in
Peru finds a broadly  countercyclical  movement  but this may be largely  driven by secular  trends.
7Aroca  and Maloney  (1998)  model  the transitions  into informality  as a destination  of entrepreneurs  and
find evidence  using logit  techniques  adapted  to panel  logit context.
8 See  Maloney  and Ribeiro  (1998),  and Hemandez  -Laos (1998).  Panagides  and Patrinos  (1994)  find some
wage effects,  but these  are likely  to disappear  when relevant  firm  characteristics,  such as size, are included.
4US. This evidence suggests that the conditional wage dispersion(wages  adjusted for human
capital) may be emerging endogenously and is not due to either government or union
intervention.
Both stylized facts suggest an interpretation of the interaction of forrnal and informal
markets rooted in the extensive literature on efficiency wages where firms voluntarily pay wages
above the market clearing level. 9 One common variant of these models arises  from the difficulty
of monitoring individual workers and the lack of any penalty from being caught "shirking" - any
activity, or lack thereof, that might be detrimental to the firm. If wages are market clearing, a
worker fired for shirking can simply get another job at the same wage.  However, if all firms pay
higher than market clearing wages, unemployment will be created in the economy that creates a
disincentive to being laid off and hence to shirking.
Since in many Latin American countries, workers can be fired only with difficulty, the
"turnover" variant of efficiency wage models seems more appropriate: Firms must invest
resources in workers when they are hired, perhaps through training or through the process of
recruitment, that will be lost if the worker leaves. Hence, it is worthwhile for firms to pay higher
wages and raise the opportunity cost of leaving to other firms or jobs.  This argument may be
particularly compelling in LDCs given the life cycle model of self-employment developed above.
In an inversion of the commonly held view that higher than market clearing wages create
informality,  it may be that the attractiveness of self-employment causes firms to pay above
market clearing wages.  This, in fact, does create a subset of the informal sector that is
9 For discussions  of the theory of efficiency  wages  see Stiglitz  (1974),  Krueger  and Summers  (1988),
Phelps  (1994).
5involuntarily  self-employed  and who are unable  to easily  move back into the formal  sector.'"
Thus,  potential  self-employed,  aware  of the high rates of failure  of small businesses,  will think
twice about  leaving formal  employment  if the probability  of being rehired  is reduced."
The efficiency  wage  approach  has the advantage  of dealing  explicitly  with the issue of
turnover,  the second  of our central  issues  to be examined. However,  it also complicates  our view
of the informal  sector  and what its existence  reveals about  inequality,  poverty  or labor  market
distortions. A large fraction  of workers  may  treat the sector as a very desirable  destination  either
to attempt  to run a business,  or as a place where  workers  quitting  an undesirable  fornal sector
job may search for another  and for them the traditional  conflation  of informality  with
disadvantage  or relative  poverty  are inappropriate.  However,  it is also clear that some fraction  is
trapped  there involuntarily-  that is the expected  byproduct  of efficiency  wages.
Despite  abstracting  from wage  rigidities introduced  by minimum  wage or unions,  this
approach  is useful  for understanding  labor  markets in the region.  First, in  Brazil,  Chile,  as in
Mexico, government  mandated  minimum  wage  and the curbed  power of labor  unions are
unconvincing  as the principal  sources  of segmentation. Second,  efficiency  wage  phenomena  are
likely  to exist  as an important  underlying  determinant  of wage  structure,  however  overlaid  by
10  Some  fraction  of the informal  sector serves  the role of unemployment  benefits  in industrialized
countries. This  raises the possibility  of an analogy  between  the size of the sector and the natural  rate of
unemployment  (NAIRU).  The large movements  in formal/informal  remuneration  in LDCs  can generating  insights
on the elasticity  of the NAIRU  to unemployment  benefits  in the industrialized  countries  where  the lack of variation
in wages/unemployment  benefits  have prohibited  rigorous  testing.  (Katz and Blanchard  1997).
11  For the worker's decision  to enter self-employment,  we have in mind a model  something  like  the "noisy
selection"  model  of Jovanovic  (1982). Here,  workers  have  only a very  diffuse  idea of their ability  as entrepreneurs
and whether  they will be able to stay in business.  Only  by actually  opening a business  can they learn about  their true
underlying  abilities. The ability  to be rehired  is therefore  and important  consideration  in risking  self-employment.
6other local institutions, and they have long term implications for labor, education, and poverty
alleviation policies.  Third, careful modeling these effects aids in identifying abnormalities in
informal sector size or turnover that may be interpretable as more reliable evidence of distortions
that are not explicitly introduced through the model.
Though the model is general equilibrium in design, the intuition can be distilled to two
equations. These can be broadly represented as an upward sloping "incentive curve" and as a
downward sloping labor demand.  curve shown in figure 1. The curves are plotted with the
probability of being hired in the formal sector on the X axis and formal wages relative to the
average in the self-employed sector on the Y axis.  The incentive curve II captures the essence of
the efficiency wage story. It represents the constraint that firms face in trying to prevent workers
from leaving with their training and opening a business in the informal sector.  The higher the
probability that a worker will be hired in the formal sector if the business turns out to be less
successful than expected, the greater the likelihood of quitting his current formal sector job,  and
hence the higher the formal sector wage must be to persuade him from trying his luck. Though it
is not a traditional labor supply curve, it incorporates the usual depressing effects on labor supply
to the formal sector of increased attractiveness of the informal sector, or a rise in taxation of
formal sector wages.  The second curve DD is similar to the traditional labor demand curve. It
can be argued that as wages rise, formal firms hire fewer workers and the probability of being
hired falls.
2.2 Comparative statics
These two curves allow analysis of the impact of several important variables on the size
7of the informal  sector,  what share  of it is likely to be voluntary,  and on rates  of turnover.  We
analyze  the impact  of three broad  classes  of policy  interventions  or economic  innovations:
Increases  in labor  productivity  or firm  profitability,  a rise in the benefit to being self employed
and changes  in hiring costs.
2.2.  a Increases  in labor  productivity  orfirm profitability.  (Z)
This includes  technological  progress,  and of particular  interest,  a fall in labor  taxes, or a
reduction  in any regulation  that adversely  affects  productivity.  Any of these changes  has the
effect  of shifting  the DD curve  to the right along  the II curve.(figure  2). As productivity
increases,  firms  are willing  to hire more workers,  and hence  to increase  the probability  of being
hired. The movement  along  the incentive  curve  implies that a higher wage  relative  to that in the
informal  sector must be paid to retain workers. But this also necessarily  implies that a larger
fraction  of informal  workers  is involuntary  and would experience  welfare  enhancements  upon
finding  ajob in the formal sector. For each  of the shocks  discussed  below,  the rise in formal
sector  employment  and wage  therefore  may have  negative  distributional  effects.
The impact  on turnover  is ambiguous. Both wages  and the probability  of being hired rise
over  time with opposing  effects  on turnover  and it is not clear,  ex ante, what the net effect  should
be. Though  the implied  shifts of curves  are the same for the following  cases,  it is worth
highlighting  certain  aspects.
Technological  progress:  A secular  rise in formal  sector  productivity  due to technological
progress  has the effect  of raising  both the level of employment  in the formal  sector, and
8the wage paid there. The model has the prediction, then, that as countries grow, a larger
and larger fraction of those self-employed are involuntary and segmentation increases
among the sectors.  For very poor countries, salaried vs. self-employment maybe very
close substitutes, but in richer countries, perhaps Argentina, self-employment is, on
average less desirable. This dynamic may offer some insight into the elusive Kuznets
relation of worsening and then improving distribution with development. A poor country
has a very large self-employed sector. As productivity lises, segmentation between the
formal and informal sector increases and increases the wage differential between formal
and informal sector workers, worsening distribution.  H[owever,  eventually, the self-
employed sector shrinks to so small a size that, though the differentials are great, the
number of workers affected is small, leading to a relative improvement of the Gini. Using
estimates of the important elasticities, section 4 shows this to be a plausible dynamic.
The indeterminacy of turnover suggests that it is not obvious that LDC's should have
higher or lower rates of turnover.
Regulations and Taxes: Any regulation that can be reinterpreted as a tax on firms-non-
wage benefits, firing costs- or any economy wide regulation that leads to lowering the
marginal product of labor reduces the size of the formal sector and lowers the formal
sector wage. It is important, however, to bear in mind that this effect is most compelling
if workers do not value these benefits.  To the degree that they do, this is simply payment
in a different form.
This even applies in some measure to restrictions on firings which can be seen as
a tax equal to the option value of the ability to divest of an underperforming asset. To the
9degree that the worker sees these costs as an insurance premium against termination, they
are passed along to workers as lower wages with no impact.  However, it is easy to
generate scenarios where this might not be the case, and the net result is to reduce
employment, and turnover. 12
It is important to highlight that the distributional impacts of a reduction in labor
taxes are the opposite of those generally postulated in the traditional view with a
minimum wage or union induced wage rigidities.  There, a reduction in taxes reduces
total remuneration to the formal sector relative to the formal, and at the same time
increases the size of the formal sector, with likely positive distributional effects. Here the
result is less clear.
2.2.  b  Rise in the benefit to being self-employed, or a reduction in worker taxes (r)
Anything that raises the benefit to being self-employed relative to being formally
employed increases the rate of turnover and causes a shift in both the incentive curve and the
demand curve (figure 3). In the former, for any probability of being hired, the formal wage must
rise to offset the increased desirability of the informal sector. In the latter, the increased cost of
retaining workers also shifts the labor demand curve left.  What is clear is that employment in the
formal sector falls.
This coincides with existing literature on unemployment in the OECD countries that
increasingly focuses on the level and duration of benefits as the key determinant of
12 See  Bentolila  and Bertola(1990)  for a discussion  of the impact  of firing costs and labor  demand.
10unemployment.  Nickell finds the duration to be the key determinant of long-run unemployment
levels while Blanchard and Jimeno(1995) attribute the relatively high Spanish unemployment to
the fact that Spaniards get access to benefits of indefinite duration if employed only 6 months of
the last 4 years while Portugese workers must have been worlking 1.5 of the last two years.
Benefits of indefinite duration are similar in principal to self-employment as an alternative to
formal work. The absence of unemployment benefits in LDCs has the effect of collapsing both
the self-employed and the "unemployed" into one sector.
The impact on relative wages, however, is ambiguous since both curves shift left, hence it
is difficult to say anything definite about distribution. This indeterminacy also prevents any ex
ante statement about turnover despite the increased difficulty of finding a formal job.
Income or other taxes: Any tax that finances a public good or whose benefits are
perceived as below its cost in terms of taxation renders the informal sector more
attractive.
Internal mobility restrictions: Where internal reallocation in the formal firn  is highly
regulated, talented workers may choose to work on their own.
2.2.  c  Changes in Hiring Costs
Any policy that serves to lower the fixed costs of hiring ( recruitment, training, etc.)
reduces the loss involved with a quit and hence the magnitudle  of efficiency wage effects.
Showing the effect graphically is difficult since it involves both shifting and changing the slopes
of both curves.  However, what is clear, is that in the limit where training costs fall to zero, there
is no longer any need to pay efficiency wages,  no segmentation, and there is an increase in
formal sector employment. The impact on turnover is positive since there is no reason for firms
11to prevent identical workers from leaving and replacing them with new ones.
Public education: Public education has long been justified on the grounds that it addresses
the externality implicit in the efficiency wage story:  the private sector will under-invest
since the basic skills they pay to impart can be easily transferred elsewhere.  To the
degree that poor LDC education systems force both training and socialization costs on
individual firms, the wage gap between self-employed and formal salaried workers will
be larger, segmentation greater and distribution worse, and a larger fraction of the self-
employed involuntarily employed. This offers another channel through which improving
education may equalize the distribution of income in the economy.
Reduced Interest Rates: Reduced interest rates lower the cost of investment in human
capital and thus lower hiring costs.
Better job matching and signaling: If the recruitment and selection process constitutes a
sizeable fixed cost, any improvement in mechanisms to promote good matching, or that
reliably signals workers' skills, such as the education certification schemes in Mexico,
cause all the same desirable outcomes.
Trade Reforms: To the degree to which other reforms, such as that of the current account,
increase the demand for skilled labor and raise implicit training costs, segmentation and
wage dispersion may increase.  This may offer one explanation for the increasing wage
dispersion observed with trade liberalization in Mexico and Chile.
123. Cross Sectional Regressions
We next test  these hypotheses on a cross section of countries for which a consistent set
of productivity and distortion variables are available.  In the first set of regressions, we examine
the determinants of self-employment as a share of the total work force. In the second set, we
focus on two measures of turnover. Using deviations from the predicted values of these
regressions, we construct somewhat speculative measures of the magnitude of distortions and of
rigidities.
3.1 Variables
The data sources and more detailed descriptions are listed in Appendix I.
3.1 Dependent Variables
Share of Workforce in Self-employment: The OECD tabulates the share of non-agriculural
workers in self-employment or as owners of firms.  To the degree possible, the same variable
was created from the employment and household surveys from Latin America.  We focus on self-
employment rather than informality more generally for two reasons. First, we believe that it is
the act of opening a business that is the central issue and that informality while important and
often highly correlated is secondary.' 3 Second, data on informality in the OECD is largely
unavailable and the LAC data sets differ in the variables available to use as proxies. Third, data
on those employed in micro-enterprises is not available for the OECD. We assume that the total
population employed in the self-employed sector, both as owners and workers is proportional to
the share declaring themselves self-employed.
Mean Tenure in the Manufacturing Sector and Share of the Manufacturing Work Force with
under Two Years of Tenure: These are two alternative variables available from the OECD and
then generated from the LAC household and labor market surveys.  We focus on manufacturing
turnover because this is the best proxy for formal sector turnover that is available.
3.1.a Formal Sector Labor Productivity/Profitability (Z)
Industrial Value Added (Indust. V.A.): The log of industrial value added per industrial worker is
13  See Levenson and Maloney(1998) for a development of this view.
13the proxy for formal  sector labor  productivity.
Social  Security  Tax-Employers  (SSEmp):  Social  security  (broadly  defined)  taxes as a share  of
the wage  by worker.  The model suggests  that there may  be different  effects.
Employment  Protection(Protection):  An index  of employment  protection  constructed  by Gustavo
Marquez  that captures  both the difficulty  of laying  off workers  and the cost in terms of severance
pay.' 4 Unfortunately,  this leads to roughly  a halving  of the available  observations  and hence a
separate  set of regressions  are run using this reduced  sample.
3.  1.  b Rise in the benefits  to being  self employed,  or a reduction  in worker  taxes.  (T)
Social  Securitv  Tax-Workers  (SSWorker):  Social  security  (broadly  defined)  taxes as a share  of
the wage  by worker.  Ideally,  we would  have  a measure  of labor productivity  in the self-employed
sector. Unfortunately,  this is not feasible  as even  in the OECD  possible  proxies,  such as wages
in the commerce  or other services  are not consistent  across  countries.  However,  social security
tax incidence  on workers  does capture  an important  element  of the relative attractiveness  of each
sector.
3.1.  c Hiring  Costs.
Education  (Education):  The share  of the appropriate  age group with secondary  education.  No
cross  country  direct  measures  of hiring  costs are available.  However,  public  education  is a public
good that addresses  exactly  the externality  identified  in the efficiency  wage  model. The more
firms  have  to train, the more  they have  to lose by workers  moving  to another  firm  or to self-
employment. We interpret  any effect  of this variable  as working  through  training  costs.
Real  Interest  Rate (Real  Interest):  The real interest  rate affects  the cost of training  workers  to
raise future  productivity  as it would  in the case of any other investment.  We use the average  of
the 30-90 day borrowing  rate deflated  by changes  in the CPI in most cases.  While  this is not
generally  the rate at which larger corporations  borrow,  it is none the less a rough indicator  of the
cost of investing  in workers  in the economy.
3.  1.d Other Variables:
Duration  of Unemployment  Benefits:  (U Benefits):  Some  share of the self-employed  in Latin
America  would  be found unemployed  in the industrialized  countries  where  unemployment
14 Chief Economist  Office  of the IDB.
14benefits exist and are often generous.  Its exclusion as an alternative to self-employment may
bias results.  For OECD countries with traditional unemployment benefits, the variable takes the
value of the duration of unemployment benefits which Nickell (1997) found this to be the most
important variable for explaining levels of unemployment. For Latin America and other
countries, we calculate the standard severance pay package given the mean tenure (or predicted if
unavailable).
Youth (Youth): We include one demographic measure as well, the share of the working
population found between the ages of 16 and 20. The model implicitly assumes homogeneous
work forces across countries.  This is clearly not true as the share of young workers is much
higher in Latin America than in the OECD countries.  This variable is most relevant to the
turnover regressions where traditionally young workers have higher rates of turnover as they
shop around for careers.  But it may also have a similar interpretation in the self-employment
regressions.
Latin Dummy (LA): We include a dummy for being from the Latin American region.  In theory,
this may capture any difference between OECD economies and the region, including labor
legislation." 5 Ideally, we would like to eliminate the significance of this variable by including the
labor market variables that it may be proxying for.
3.2 Results
The results must be interpreted with caution.  First, we have at best 40 observations and
in our most courageous moments, only 17. This in some cases can make the results sensitive to
the countries included.  Second, the data are not uniform.  M[ost  of the OECD variables were
gleaned from presumably consistent publications of that organization while the Latin variables
were individually extracted from not necessarily consistent survey data. The LAC dummy may
pick up these data discrepancies.
Despite these potential pit-falls, the regressions prove surprisingly robust and consistent
15 We included a squared income term as well but it was never significant.  This does not, however
preclude more exotic non-linear functions.
15with the model. The three Formerly Socialist Countries in the sample, Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland have extraordinarily low self employed sectors given their income level and affected
the results.  Since it seems likely that the repression of entrepreneurial freedom under
communism is related to this result, we did drop these. However, the addition or subtraction of
most of the other countries might change the parameter values some, but the overall story
remains the same.
3.2 Results: SelfEmployment
The results are broadly consistent across the regressions.  Column I  a in table 2 presents
the complete regression with all variables included with the exception of the employment
protection measure. As is clear, the employers' social security tax, the real interest rate, the level
of education, the share of young people enter significantly and of predicted sign. Progressive
parsing out of the less significant variables in column lb makes the labor productivity and
educational variables significant. In no case was the worker's share of social security remotely
significant. Part of this poor performance may be due to measurement error.  In roughly 25% of
the cases, the social security law dictates a progressive tax that varies greatly across the range of
incomes.  We chose the midpoint of this range, but we can have no way of knowing if, in fact,
this represents that average tax on labor. Similarly, the unemployment benefits variable is never
significant, nor, in this case, is the LA dummy.
The significant variables enter of the signs predicted by theory.  Most important in terms
of magnitude is formal sector labor productivity.  Taking the extreme values of this variable
would account for 9.6 points of the variance in the share of self-employments detailed in column
161 of table 3.  Figure 4 illustrates the same, but important conclusion:  a large self-employed
sector is not ipso  facto evidence of distortions, but that the opportunity cost of self-employment
is lower in poorer countries.
The relative youth of Latin America's population also explains much of the variance with
the spread across the sample accounting for 8.8% of the higher share in self-employment. The
education variable that measures the degree to which firms must bear the burden of financing
overall education would account for roughly 7.5 percentage point difference. Real interest rates
are also surprisingly important. Peru's very high self-employed sector (46%) and high real
interest rates (67%) are clearly dominating the relationship although even dropping this outlier
yields a significant coefficient. The difference between real irnterest  rates of under 5% as in the
OECD vs often above 30% in Latin America  is worth over 6%. Once again, the importance of
ensuring macro-economic stability, and reducing risk to bringr  down interest rates seems clear.
In general, these effects dwarf the impact of any of the three labor market variables.
Across the range observed, social security taxes on employers explain relatively little of the size
of the sector,  3.2 percentage points in the share of self-employment.
The same exercise was repeated with the smaller sample arising from using the Marquez
protection index, Ic-i e.  With fewer observations, the apparent collinearity of the productivity
variable and education variables makes identifying the "correct" parsimonious form difficult (Id-
le). However, in all cases, the employment protection index has the impact of increasing the size
of the self-employed sector.  But, again, the difference between the highly protective Bolivia,
Honduras, Mexico, Peru or Spain compared to the unprotective US or UK  is worth only about
1.35 percentage points in the share of self-employment, a fairly small impact.  The results are
17similar to those of Marquez (1998) who also found a positive impact of his protection index, as
well as a negative sign on GDP per capita which may be seen as a proxy for formal sector
productivity.
In sum, the three labor distortion variables, the tax on salaries, on payroll, and restrictions
on hiring and firing have relatively small impacts compared to those of the productivity, real
interest rate, education variables and, in the larger sample, the relative youth measure.  Thus,
given the level of productivity in a country which again, may be affected by labor legislation, it
is hard to argue that these distortions are responsible for the size of the sector.
The Adjusted Size of the Informal Sector: A Measure of Unobserved Distortions?
Can we say anything about distortions on which we have little reliable information, such
as union or government induced wage rigidities from these regressions?  Perhaps. In theory, the
residuals of the regression capture the impact of all variables not explicitly included in the
regression, including other labor market distortions. It is absolutely correct to argue that they also
include any country specific variables, and any error in measuring sector size which cast doubt
on using the residuals for this purpose.  However, this critique applies to the use of the raw sector
sizes as well and if sector size is thought to contain information, then the adjusted values
obtained from the residuals are probably more appropriate.
Table 3 tabulates three sets of residuals from regressions on subsets of the significant
explanatory variables. The results tell a reasonable story with a few exceptions.  The first set of
residuals are those from regressing only on formal sector labor productivity only. The complete
re-ranking of size shows immediately the importance of compensating for productivity, or more
18generally level of development  when drawing inferences froni the size of the sector. Among  the
OECD countries, they tell a story that is broadly consistent with the literature and suggest that
the approach is not entirely misguided.  The U.S., Canada show up as relatively clean, while
Spain, Greece and Italy appear heavily burdened. Among the Latin countries,  Costa Rica,
Honduras, Guatemala, Chile, Paraguay, Brazil are all below trend in their share of the work force
in self-employment and hence, arguably, with less onerous legislation than the mean, while
Colombia, Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela and Peru far above.
The second set of residuals add the structural variables measuring share of young people
in the work force and the level of education, as well as the level of interest rates.  The
extremeness of this last variable and the difficulty of measuring it may distort the results some.
Mexico is now firmly below trend and Chile, with relatively mnoderate  interest rates, is actually
above, although not by a significant amount.  Peru now emerges as far less pathological that
previously, but it still is joined by Argentina, and Venezuela as appearing to have a high level of
unobserved distortions.
The third set of residuals add to the regressors the burden of taxation for social security.
Consistent with the previous findings, this does little to change the overall ranking although
Mexico's sector share is now even more below trend and Colombia approaches trend.
The final set of residuals attempts to incorporate the Marquez index. To take advantage of
the more precise parameter estimates from the large sample, they are constructed by taking Resid
3 and regressing it on the measure of employment protection for the countries for which it was
available. In general, Latin America shifts up in the rankings due to their overall higher firing
costs.  Now, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Mexico, Honduras, and El Salvador, and Paraguay appear to
19have fewer residual distortions than the U.S. or most OECD countries.  The Latin Countries that
still appear with residual distortions are Venezuela, Argentina, Peru and to a lesser degree
Colombia and Chile.
Again, this entire exercise is distorted to the degree that sector size is poorly measured, or
that included variables are correlated with those excluded.  Still, as a measure of segmentation, it
is probably better than conventional comparisons of wages among sectors, and suggests a fairly
robust story.  Numerous countries in the region do not appear to be unduly saddled by labor
legislation relative to that elsewhere.
These results are somewhat at odds with some previous work.  Loayza (1996) built a
model of informality that focuses largely on issues of taxes and regulation of business. He also
generates standardize estimates of the size of the informal sector as a share of production, based
on the VAT evasion rate.  Chile, Argentina, and Costa Rica to have the lowest adjusted size and
Peru, Panama, and Bolivia to have the largest. Given the possible divergence of VAT evasion
rates from the relative share of employment in self-employment, these differences are, perhaps,
not surprising.  The results are also not entirely consistent with the indexes of distortion
calculated in The Long March, a regional reform perspective published by the World Bank,
which showed Peru, Chile and Colombia among the most liberalized and Mexico, Bolivia and
perhaps Brazil among the least. This divergence, again, may be due to data problems-Chile may
count its self -employed more conscientiously. But it also may be the case that enforcement
varies greatly, and that a formally rigid market may, in practice, be quite fluid.
203.3 Results:  Turnover
The turnover results are more difficult to interpret first, because of the fewer degrees of
freedom available, and second because the theory is far less c]l[ear  about what the signs should be.
Nonetheless, the results are provocative." 6
Mean Tenure
Columns l a to I c in table 4 present various specification of average tenure in
manufacturing employment.  Column a includes all variables in the specification, again with the
exclusion of the protection variable. Neither the LAC, Youth, Unemployment Benefits enter
significantly.  Labor productivity enters both in levels and with its square suggesting a non-linear
relationship.  Taken at the mean, labor productivity appears to have a negative impact on tenure.
This can be reversed with the exclusion of all other variables, but the inclusion of the share of the
population with secondary schooling reverses its sign.  Thus, although the OECD countries have
more stable work forces, it appears that it is the fact that they are educated, rather than rich that
drives the result. Both taxes on social security appear to increase tenure and real interest rates
decrease it.  Again, these results are consistent with the theoretical framework.
The reduction in sample to 17 observations with the inclusion of the employment
protection variable leaves only the productivity,  social security tax on employers and protection
variables significant.  The latter enters with predicted sign, suggesting that it does negatively
affect turnover and importantly.  The difference across the range from the U.S.(1) to Mexico to
Venezuela (37) accounts for 3.24 years on a mean of about 9.
16 See Marquez and Pages (1998) for a graphical treatment of these issues. The econometric results here
are broadly consistent with their findings.
21Table 5 presents a set of residuals for the average job tenure regression analogous to those
previous. With the usual caveats about small sample size and the possible correlation of
ommitted variables with those included, Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil, Bolivia appear with greater
than average turnover when adjusted for productivity while Paraguay, Argentina, Honduras and
Panama are below suggesting less.  When adjusted for education levels and interest rates, Brazil
shows closer to mean turnover and Panama now is above.  Adding employers' social security
contributions has the effect of bringing Honduras up above mean turnover and moving Panama
below.
The share of the manufacturing workforce with under two years of seniority.
The results for the second measure of turnover, the share of the manufacturing work
force with under 2 years of tenure are broadly consistent but suggest the sensitivity of the results
when sample sizes are so small. Labor productivity, the real interest rate,  the employers
contribution to social security, and education variables enter significantly and with signs
consistent with the previous results. As column 2a suggests, the education variable proved very
unstable with the youth variable included.  However, because the youth variable entered with the
sign opposite to that expected, the preferred regression was that presented in 2b.  2c suggests that
in these regressions, the Marquez protection variable does not enter significantly. The residuals
are not presented in tabular formn  for this regression.
3.  The Overall Picture
Figures 5a and 5b plot the residuals from the second set of residuals (productivity,
education, real interest rate, youth) from the self-employment regression and from the turnover
22regressions to see if the combination of the two can reveal anything about the functioning of a
given labor market.  Though speculative, we will interpret these residuals as measuring labor
market distortion (self -employment above the conditional mean) and rigidity (average tenure
above the conditional mean).  In the North East quadrant of fiigure  5a, rigid and distorted
economies, we find  Greece, Italy and Spain, all European conmtries  renowned for repressive
labor codes.  It is, however, interesting to note that only one Latin country appears in this
quadrant, perhaps unsurprisingly Argentina, but in figure 5b it will show higher than average
turnover. In both graphs, Honduras, Paraguay, also appear sornewhat rigid although less distorted
than average. Among most flexible and  undistorted in the South West quadrant we find,
unsurprisingly, the U.S. and Canada, accompanied by Panama, Bolivia, Brazil. Venezuela, Peru.
There is some sensitivity of the results to which measure of turnover is used.  Using the share of
workers with under 2 years of tenure,  Figure 5b suggests that Argentina has above average
flexiblity and Brazil, below average. The graphs were redone replacing industrial value added per
worker with purchasing power parity adjusted per capita GNP.  The placement of countries
changed little suggesting that the results are not very sensitive to the exact measure of labor
productivity used. In sum, with some exceptions and with strong caveats about the reliability of
the results, Latin labor markets do not appear exceptionally distorted, or inflexible.
4. Conclusion
This paper has presented the results of cross country regressions motivated by an
efficiency wage model of the LDC economy. The model departs from the assumption that for
many workers, informal self-employment is a desirable destination for salaried workers rather
23than the disadvantage  sector of a market made dual  by union  or government  induced  wage
rigidities.  Nonetheless,  segmentation  will always  be present  in all labor markets,  even in the
absence  of unions or minimum  wages  so long as firms  seek to retain workers  in whom  they  have
invested.  Firms will pay above  market  clearing  "efficiency  wages"  to lower  turnover  and in the
process,  create  unemployment  or segmentation  that may cut across  lines of formality. The
predictions  about  the size of the self employed  sector  and turnover  were tested using cross
sectional  OECD  and Latin American  data and generally  supported.
The size of the informal  sector can tell something  about the impact  of  labor  legislation
on efficiency  or distribution,  but only if adjusted  for demographic  and other  variables  that theory
suggests  are important. Raw measures  of sector  size are not a reliable  measure of distortions  or
inequality. The adjusted  size of the informal  sector suggests  that, Venezuela,  Peru, Argentina,
and perhaps  Colombia  emerge  as having  relatively  high levels  of distortion  by global  standards,
while Brazil,  Costa Rica, Panama,  Bolivia,  Mexico,  Guatemala,  Honduras,  and Paraguay  have
lower  than  average  distortions.  Such  crude comparisons  of adjusted sector  sizes may offer an
alternative  to meaningless  comparisons  of earnings  across  formal  and informal  sectors.  The
divergence  of these measures  from those created  from formal  labor  legislation  in The  Long
March  may suggest  differences  in enforcement,  or the ability of the market  to work around
oppressive  regulations.
Comparisons  of raw turnover  rates across  countries  tell us little about true labor  market
flexibility.  Theory  and preliminary  empirical  work suggests  that many variables  affect  turnover
in significant  ways. Once  these are considered,  Latin  American  labor markets  appear  of average
flexibility:  Paraguay,  Honduras,  and perhaps  Argentina  and Brazil  appear  more rigid  than
24average while Bolivia, Panama, and perhaps Peru are less.
Barriers to firing workers, and social security taxes on firms appear to reduce the size of
the formal sector. Anticipation of costly firing may lead to a reluctance to employ new workers
while high non-wage benefits raise labor costs. That said, empirically, the level of formal sector
productivity, real interest rates, and education levels in general have a larger impact on the size
of the informal sector than labor market taxes or barriers to firing.
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Appendix I: Data Sources
1. Tenure variables of the OECD countries are from the following sources:
Table 2: Measures ofthe Sluggishness of Employment and of Adjustment Costs, Page 11, in Stephen
Nickell, "Labour Market Dynamics in OECD Countries",
Centre for Economic Performance, Discussion Paper #255, August 1995
Table 5.5: Distribution of Employment by Employer Tenure, 1995, Page 138,
Table 5.6: Average Employer Tenure by gender, Age, Industry, Occupation, 1995, Page 139, in
"OECD Employment Outlook, July 1997",
2. Self-employment rate of the OECD countries is from "OECD Labour Force Statistics 1976-
1996."
3. Self-employment rate and tenure variables of the Latin America and the Caribbean countries
are from various CEPAL surveys of the following years: Arg;entina 1992,Bolivia 1995,Chile
1995, Colombia 1995, Costa Rica 1995, El Salvador 1995, Guatemala 1989, Honduras 1995,
Mexicol994,  Panama 1995, Paraguay 1995, Peru 1996, Uruguay 1995, Venezuela 1995.
4. Per capita GNP and wages of Industrial workers are from Table 1: Basic Indicators, Page
214,215 and Table 12: Structure of the Economy: Production in "World Development Report
1997",
5. Employment Protection variables provided by Gustavo Marquez, Chief Economist Office,
IDB.
6. Social Security variables are from Table3: Contribution rates for social security programs -
OECD countries(1997), and Table 5.8: Social security and non-wage labour costs, in "Social
Security Programs Throughout the World - 1997".
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32Table 1: Size of Informal Self-Employment and Turnover Rates
LAC'  OECD
% Workforce in Informal Self-Employment  31.5  12.9
% <2  Years Seniority (Manufactures)  38.1  24.5
Average Tenure (Manufactures)  7.61  10.5
33Table 2:  Determinants  of Self-Employment
Self- Employed  as Share  of Work Force
1-a  1-b  1-c  1-d  1-e
C  0.26  0.36  0.11  0.25  0.50
(1.33)  (2.46)  (.36)  (1.46)  (3.29)
Indust  VA.  -0.02  -0.03  0.00  -0.01  -0.05
(1.26)  (2.24)  (.02)  (.25)  (3.19)
SS Worker  -0.09  0.02
(.89)  (.14)
SS Emp  0.16  0.16  0.09  0.00  0.15
(2.81)  (2.81)  (.95)  (3.69)  (1.63)
Protection  3.90E-03  4.50E-03  4.00E-03
(2.58)  (3.69)  (2.93)
U Benefits  4.OOE-04  -1.20tE-04
(.72)  (.01)
Real Interest  0.22  0.23  0.23  0.24  0.21
(3.91)  (4.71)  (3.29)  (4.13)  (3.21)
Secondary  -1.OOE-03  -1.OOE-03 -1.50E-03  -1.60E-03
(1.91)  (2.37)  (1.53)  (2.4)
Youth  3.86  4.14  1.79
(2.33)  (2.8)  (.63)
LAC  0.04  0.02
.(1.14)  (.32)
[NOBS  36  40  19  20  20
JR2  10.92  0.90  0.94  0.93  0.90
Note: t-statistics below coefficients.
34Table  3: Residuals  of Self- Employment  Regressions
(Ranked by Deviation from Predicted Share)
Country  % Self-Emp  Resid 1 Country  Resid  2 Country  Resid  3 Country  Resid  4
Costa  Rica  24.4  -7.6 Costa  Rica  -7.9 Brazil  -8.9 Brazil  -7.2
Honduras  31.8  -6.8 France  -7.5 France  -5.5 Costa  Rica  -6.4
Austria  6.6  -5.9 Austria  -7.2 Costa  Rica  -5.5 Bolivia  -5.2
Panama  26.2  -5.1 Honduras  -4.7 Austria  -3.9 Mexico  -4.8
US  7.3  -4.8 Sweden  -4.5 Sweden  -3.5 France  -3.3
Canada  8.9  -4.6 US  -3.6 Mexico  -3.3 Honduras  -3.1
Guatemala  32.3  -4.1 Brazil  -3.0 Norway  -2.9 Portugal  -2.3
France  8.6  -4.1 Guatemala  -2.7 US  -2.9 Guatemala  -1.1
Denmark  6.9  -3.6 Germany  -2.5 Ireland  -2.8 El Salvador  -0.4
Ireland  13.5  -3.3 Portugal  -2.5 Bolivia  -2.6 Ireland  -0.4
Chile  25.2  -3.2 Finland  -2.5 Canada  -2.2 Paraguay  -0.2
Paraguay  31.7  -3.2 Canada  -2.4 Portugal  -2.1 Denmark  0.7
Germany  8.5  -2.8 Paraguay  -2.3 Netherlands  -1.2 Spain  0.9
Netherlands  9.6  -2.7 Panama  -1.9 Japan  -1.1 US  1.0
Norway  5.9  -2.7 Ireland  -1.9 Guatemala  -1.0 Germany  1.0
Luxembourg  5.8  -2.3 Norway  -1.6 Honduras  -1.0 Chile  1.1
Sweden  9.3  -1.9 Bolivia  -1.4 Panama  -1.0 Netherlands  1.5
Brazil  23.2  -1.8 Mexico  -1.3 Germany  -0.5 Colombia  1.7
Finland  9.7  -1.8 Belgium  -1.1 Paraguay  -0.3 Peru  2.4
Australia  12.3  -1.4 Chile  -1.1 Denmark  0.0 Italy  2.6
Bolivia  39.2  -1.2 Netherlands  -1.0 Korea  0.3 Argentina  2.7
UK  12.6  -0.7 Luxembourg  -0.9 Australia  0.3  UK  2.7
Portugal  19.5  -0.7 Spain  -0.5 Uruguay  0.4 Belgium  3.5
New Zealand  16.2  -0.5 Korea  -0.2 Luxembourg  0.7 Venezuela  6.1
Mexico  26.5  0.2  Turkey  0.4 El Salvador  0.8 Greece  6.6
El Salvador  35.2  0.2  Colombia  0.4 Belgiumn  1.5
Turkey  26.0  0.7  Denmark  0.5 Turkey  1.5
Belgium  13.3  0.8  UK  1.1 Chile  1.8
Japan  9.9  1.7 El Salvador  1.9 Spain  2.2
Colombia  34.2  2.3  Australia  2.7  Italy  2.2
Spain  18.6  2.4  Japan  2.8  Finland  2.2
Switzerland  10.6  2.5  Argentina  2.9  Iceland  2.3
Iceland  15.5  4.0  New  Zealand  3.1  UK  2.3
Korea  23.6  4.3  Italy  3.2  New  Zealand  2.9
Argentina  28.5  5.9  Iceland  4.7  Argentina  3.1
Uruguay  32.8  6.8  Switzerland  5.0 Switzerland  3.1
Venezuela  34.4  8.4  Uruguay  5.3 Colomblia  3.9
Greece  27.7  8.4  Greece  7.2  Peru  4.3
Italy  22.8  9.4  Venezuela  8.2 Greece  7.3
Peru  46.1  18.6 Peru  17.2 Venezuela  8.9
Notes:  Res 1 from  regression  on formal  productivity.  Res 2 from regression
that also  includes  employers  social  security  contribution.  Res 3 includes
also education,  youth, and real  interest  rates.  Res  4 are residuals  of Res  3 on
Job Protection.
35Table 4: Determinants  of Turnover
Manufactures
Mean Tenure  %< 2 Years
1-a  1-b  1-c  2-a  2-b  2-c
C  60.58  74.35  43.30  -288.38  -288.67  -272.71
(3.09)  (4.23)  (6.03)  (3.82)  (4.78)  (2.23)
Indust. V.A  -11.95  -16.21  -3.19  84.40  77.61  73.37
(2.35)  (3.99)  (4.88)  (4.17)  (4.02)  (2.47)
I.V.A. sq  0.64  0.92  -4.84  -4.31  -3.98
(2.07)  (3.99)  (3.84)  (3.89)  (2.12)
SS Worker  8.13  8.68  -2.51
(3.29)  (3.62)  (.16)
SS Emp  7.00  6.23  11.65  -46.92  -44.45  -41.84
(1.79)  (1.79)  (5.86)  -(4.63)  (3.92)  (2.54)
Protection  0.09  -0.05
(2.99)  (.21)
U Benefits  -0.03  -0.13
-(1.13)  -(1.42)
Real Intere  -7.41  -7.10  14.45  21.44  24.14
(1.92)  (1.89)  (1.65)  (2.22)  (1.98)
Secondary  0.05  0.04  -0.07  -0.24  -0.31
(2.15)  (2.23)  (.69)  (2.57)  (2.11)
Youth  -39.23  -754.73
(.48)  (2.38)
LAC  -0.70  10.13
(.41)  (1.33)
NOBS  25  26  171  23  24  16
R2  0.63  0.68  0.81  0.50  0.65  0.54
Note:  t-statistics below coefficient.
36Table 5:  Residuals of Average Job Tenure in Manufacturing Regressions
(Ranked by Deviations from Predicted Tenure)
Country  vg. Tenure  Resid 1 Country  Resid 2 Country  Resid 3
Dernark  7.80  -3.35 Denmark  -3.76 Bolivia  -1.84
Australia  7.00  -3.08 Australia  -2.69 Venezuela  -1.56
Venezuela  5.77  -1.87 Ireland  -1.78 Austria  -1.49
Bolivia  6.22  -1.84 Bolivia  -1.69 Denmark  -1.47
Brazil  6.25  -1.50 US  -1.38 Netherlands  -0.95
Switzerland  10.60  -1.43 UK  -1.11 US  -0.81
US  9.20  -1.40 Venezuela  -1.10 Ireland  -0.79
Canada  8.90  -1.25 Canada  -0.98 Italy  -0.54
UK  9.00  -1.20 Switzerland  -0.65 Australia  -0.46
Ireland  8.30  -0.93 Austria  -0.36 UK  -0.45
Netherlands  10.30  -0.21 Panama  -0.29 France  -0.43
Germany  10.80  -0.09 Brazil  -0.24 Germany  -0.27
Austria  10.60  0.14 Germany  -0.03 Spain  -0.26
Greece  9.00  0.34 Netherlands  0.03 Honduras  -0.16
Panama  7.84  0.45 Honduras  0.21  Switzerland  0.16
Honduras  8.39  0.56  Greece  0.39 Sweden  0.17
Sweden  11.50  0.60  Spain  0.40  Canada  0.29
Argentina  8.89  0.83 Finland  0.75 Argentina  0.30
Italy  11.20  1.03 Sweden  0.75 Brazil  0.36
Japan  13.10  1.09 Argentina  0.97 Belgium  0.39
Belgium  11.80  1.34 Belgium  1.15 Greece  0.47
Finland  12.30  1.53 France  1.32 Finland  0.69
Spain  10.90  1.53 Japan  1.63 Panama  1.00
France  12.10  1.71 Italy  1.68 Japan  1.45
Portugal  10.40  1.92 Portugal  1.80 Portugal  1.55
Paraguay  9.93  2.44 Luxembourg  2.43  Luxembourg  2.22
Luxembourg  14.70  2.63 Paraguay  2.54 Paraguay  2.44
Notes: Resid 1 from regression on formal sector productivity. Resid 2 from regression
that also includes real interest rate, and education. Resid 3 includes also employers'
social security contribution.
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